Sriman Madhvacharya – Chapter 15 – Part I

Introduction to the Chapter

This Chapter is very big, with 141 stanzas – out of which half (70) describe the marathon debate between Acharya Madhva and Sri Trivikrama Panditacharya, which led to the latter’s defeat and acceptance of Tatvavada. The other half describes the main disciples of Madhva and the composition of the Anuvyakhyana by Madhva as per Trivikrama’s request. The first half in essence is a summary of the defence of Tatvavada against all rival schools, given very briefly, but elaborated in other compositions of Madhva. The literal meanings of the shlokas will not convey a total picture unless this background is kept in mind. To give some idea of these arguments without completely diverging from the subject and prolonging the translation unduly, a brief note is attached against each shloka where required in Italics. For greater insight into the issues, original compositions should be studied.

Madhvacharya expounds BrahmaSutra Bhashya

Then Acharya Madhva who had stayed for some time in Vishnumangala temple, stayed in another nearby temple at Kudel which was generally patronised by all villagers. He started expounding his wonderful BrahmaSutra Bhashya again.

Note: there is a clear reference to another temple, (than Vishnumangala temple with the Idol of Vishnumurthy, where Madhva completed his Chathurmasya). This has been called Amaralaya or Kudel in Bhavaprakashika, which was located in a village of the same name.

He saw in front of him, Trivikrama like an opponent in war, who rode the chariot of another school of Vedanta (Mayavada) and wearing the weapons in the form of many great and sharp logical arguments.

Description of Madhva’s discourse

Then, the wonderful discourse establishing the Supremacy of Lord Vishnu emerged from the lotus face of Madhva, like an army coming out of its bivouac to win victories for the king.

The speech/movement of the army was continuous without undue haste or being too slow. It had no defects (like pronunciation, pauses or repetitions etc or gaps or disorder in movement). For those who saw it from a distance, it appeared like a continuous entity without parts, like an army without elements like soldiers, horses, chariots etc.

The speech – army had groups of chariots in the form of Brahma Sutras, unstoppable Elephants in the form of Apaurusheya Shrutis, Foot soldiers in the form of valid logical derivations, and Horses in the form of many types of Paurusheya texts.

Note: The Shruti texts are irrefutable (unstoppable) as they are Apaurusheya and defectless.

Speech: It was dear to the immutable Lord Hari, and had excellent sounds like the roaring of thunder. It was very pleasant to listen and was very clear in the precise meanings (in the exposition of Shastra tenets).

Army: It was full of speeding horses and roared like thunder. Its echelons were terrifying to its enemies, when it emerged in its vastness from the camp.

Mahalakshmi: She is extremely dear to Sri Hari, who has none of the six defects (growth, decline etc). She has excellent breasts and very sweet sounds. She is the daughter of the ocean and is of the essence of vast Tejas (Effulgence).

Note: Mahalakshmi is the main Abhimani Devata of Shruties and is thus correctly compared with the discourse of Madhva, which was expounding on the purport of the Shruties.

The speech/Ganga originated on the Lotus feet of Sri Hari, the Lord of Lakshmi. It was a part of the work to be done by Chaturmukha Brahma. It was held in reverence by Rudra on his head and was purifying with its holiness all the people who bathed in it.

Essence of Madhva’s discourse is summed up

The all knowing Madhva established by Shruti Pramana and by Yukthis (logical arguments) that Narayana (Vishnu) has infinite auspicious qualities such as Jnana, Bala, Shakthi, Aishwarya, Tejas etc. (Knowledge, Strength, Capacity, Possessions, Effulgence etc). He is called Brahma (in Vedanta) as he is Paripoorna – totally endowed – and his infinity and completeness of qualities can not be determined in space, time, qualities and numbers. He is known only by the Vedas and propounded by them as their main purpose.

He is the (only) Doer – in the universe, as every thing else is completely in His control and He is all knowing.

Note: The commentators Vishvapathi Tirtha, Vedanga Tirtha etc have given the Shruti texts supporting these interpretations. All these are not being reproduced here. But, it may be seen that the detailed discussions which follow in the next shloka onwards up to shloka 63 take up each issue, consider the Poorvapaksha and give the final position of Tatvavada with brief arguments for the conclusion. The main propositions are:

1. Ananthagunaparipoornathva – being full of infinite auspicious qualities.

2. Brahma of the Vedas is Narayana/Vishnu

3. Being known only by the Vedas, which have Him as their main purport (and by no other independent means).

4. Vishvakarthruthva, Sarvajnatha etc.

Samkhyas classify and define characteristics of entities and the orderly derivation of the world of day to day experience from them. There are two kinds – Those who do not accept the existence of the Supreme Being (Nireeswara) and those who accept the Supreme Being and souls along with Nature principle (Seswara). The Nireeswara Samkhyas are rejected first. Out of these, the ones who do not accept the need for a creator Iswara or Supreme Being, arguing that Nature unaided by any superforce is responsible for the world by a process of natural transformation. Please note that this is the “simplest” explanation possible and is also favoured by modern science.

If it is argued that Pradhana (Nature principle) is the primal cause which transforms itself into the world, by giving the example of Milk (becoming Curds without any other known agent and by itself), the example given (of Milk) is defective.

Note: The method used by Poorvapaksha is to use the Anumana that the world is a transformation of Nature principle, which happens by itself, as the world transformation is independent and not under the control of any other agency external to it. The example given is that of Milk curdling by itself. Note the similarity to modern scientific concepts or Charvakas, who believe that the existence of God is unproven as a primal cause. The Siddhanta answer is that Milk curdling is not an independent process according to Shruti, which says – “Yetena ha vaava payo mandam bhavati”. Even the transformation of milk to curds is caused by God. The argument of refutation of Poorvapaksha is based on Shruti. Other Shruti texts preclude any other example being given of a transformation independent of the Supreme Being.

We (Tatvavada) offer the following Anumana to establish our Siddhanta – The creation (of the world) under consideration must be according to the desire of a Chetana, as it is a creation. The example is the creation of cloth.

Note: The act of creation implies a creator, as the weaver creates cloth. Inert entities like cotton etc do not transform themselves into cloth etc without such an external creator. There is no example of creation being done on its own by non-conscious entities. The same method is used to reject other schools like Bhatta etc which argue that Iswara is unnecessary.

Some Nireeshwara samkhyas hold that though a Chetana is required for the creation of the world, he is only a secondary cause and only the Pradhana is the primal cause.

The position of those who hold that creation is caused by Pradhana being the main entity (Angi) and Chetanas as secondary causes (Angas) without accepting the control of an independent Iswara for creation is also untenable.

Note: The position of these schools is that just as Milk is assisted to become Curd by the action of adding some curdling agent to it by a human being, Iswara or Chetana is required in a secondary role for the creation of this world. Some hold that Iswara is not needed, but souls whose Karmas determine creation of the physical world, their bodies etc would be sufficient. This position is rejected by offering a counter Anumana, as follows.

The entire scheme of Karya (created entities) has been created by the all knowing Iswara, as it is some thing which came into existence, without having been in existence earlier. (Saadi – Product with a beginning). This is so, as it is unlike Aatman. Thus, the Anumana (Vyatireki) proves the existence of Iswara.

Note: The world is not beginningless like the souls. Having come into existence, it must have had a creator, who is all knowing to be able to create it. There is no example possible for a Sarvajna creator and hence a direct logical statement with an example is not possible. But, by proving that the negative – nonbeginningless entity must have a creator, the existence of Iswara is proved by the Anumana. It may be noted here, that the opponent does not accept Agamas (Vedas) which clearly state the existence of Iswara. Other means like Prathyaksha (direct cognition by the senses) and Anumana without an example are not available for establishing Iswara,.

The previous verse appears to “prove’ the existence of Iswara without taking the Vedas into consideration. This position is not acceptable to Tatvavada.

Vedas are the irrefutable base which gives strength to all Anumanas. Those Anumanas which do not have their support are like unchaste women without the control of their husbands and can be used to prove any thing.

Note: Entities which are extrasensory (like Iswara, Sin, Merit etc) can not be established by either Prathyaksha or unassisted Anumana and must have the support of Agamas. The Anumana given in the previous shloka is in the nature of a rejoinder to the opponent’s argument that Iswara does not exist.

Rejection of Bhaskara school claiming that Universe is a transformation of Brahma

Brahma being a Chetana can never be a Parinami (transformatory) cause as such a Parinami cause will never be a Chetana, like Milk etc.

Note: Bhaskara and similar schools say that Brahma itself will transform into the Universe. Such transformation can only be from one non-living to another non-living entity. Brahma being pure Chetana can not be transformed in this manner into an inert/non-living entity. Only a Non-living Jada entity can undergo such transformation into another – Mud into a pot, Milk into Curd etc.

Rejection of Schools like Pashupatha as they are not based on the Vedas

Pashupathi (Rudra) can not be the primal cause of the world, as his defects are well known, like any normal human being. If even Rudra can not be so, what needs to be said about Ganapathi, Surya etc as espoused by the ignorant.

Note: The different schools which consider Rudra, Ganapthi, Surya, Skandha, Shakthi etc as Supreme are rejected on the ground that all these deities have known defects and limitations. An example is the “crying” of Rudra, due to which he derived that name. The underlying point is that the Supreme Being has to be perfect and without any flaws in His essence.

Rejection of Vaisheshika school

Vaisheshikas hold that Iswara can not have the essence of bliss and other auspicious qualities, as He does not have sorrow etc. Who ever is not without happiness, can never be without sorrow, as seen in the example of the Samsari soul.

Note: The Vaisheshika poorvapaksha argues that happiness is invariably coupled with misery, as seen in the example of all of us. As Iswara is free from sorrow (in His essence), He has to be one with no bliss also.

If this is accepted, we will counter it with the logical fallacy that God can not be a repository of knowledge, as He is free from all delusion or wrong knowledge. He who is not without knowledge is not without wrong knowledge also, as is the case of a Samsari soul. (Only those who are without knowledge, can be free of delusion).

Note: By offering the counter proposal which is absurd, Madhva shows that the underlying premise is wrong. The Vaisheshika accepts that Iswara has knowledge, but no bliss.

If you (Vaisheshika) answer that Iswara is full of knowledge according to the Shruti, and this Anumana “proving” Him ignorant is fallacious, have you not heard the Shruti which proclaims that Iswara is full of bliss?

Note: The Vaisheshika accepts Shrutis as Pramana and argues that Iswara is all knowing according to it.

(“Yah sarvajnah sarvavidyasya jnanamayam thapah”). We quote the Shruti – “Anandam brahmano vidvan na bhibhethi kuthaschana” etc to show that Iswara is of the essence of bliss also.

The stupid one has forgotten that Iswara will have to be considered as subject to sorrow according to his own logic, if He does not have bliss. A pity! He has said that (He has no bliss) only to ensure the absence of sorrow to Him.

Note: This is based on the principle that a Chetana (conscious entity) must have either sorrow or happiness/bliss (all Chetanas like us) and only an inert non-conscious entity can have neither. If happiness is precluded for Iswara who is a Chetana, Misery must be there in Him. It is therefore correct to accept that He has only bliss as per Shruti, instead of this absurdity of blisslessness (also ruled out by Shruti).

The concept of Iswara having neither bliss nor misery is again discounted

The Samsari soul has sorrow related to him by a Samavaya relationship. The Samavaya relation between Iswara and His all knowledge, desire etc is identical with that with the Jiva. Therefore, Iswara must also be subject to sorrow. If this identity of the Samavaya relationships is not accepted, there will have to be many samavayas.

Note: The Vaisheshikas consider that the relationship between an object and its quality is a Samavaya relationship which is only one according to them. Therefore, the Samavaya relationships between the Jiva and his sorrow and Iswara and his knowledge etc have to be identical, thus giving sorrow also to Iswara. If these are non-identical, they are going against their own basic tenet (ApaSiddhanta).

To explain away this obvious error, the Vaisheshika can argue that though the samavaya

relation is one, it appears to be different due to Upadhi. This is examined next by Madhva.

If the difference between the two Samavayas is considered to be due to Upadhi, let it be specified whether this Upadhi itself is real or unreal. In both cases, the defects stated by us (sorrow to Iswara or non-identity of the samavaya relation) will be unavoidable. There can not be a third alternative of Sadasadvilkshana (different from both real and unreal) for Upadhi, in your case, as the Mayavadis would propose.

Note: The position of Sadasadvilakshana, as some thing which is neither real nor unreal is not acceptable for a Vaisheshika, who swears by logic, as it is self-inconsistent. Upadhi is an external entity which transforms the behaviour of the main entity.

The view of the Vaisheshikas that Iswara and His qualities like knowledge etc have difference between them due to Upadhi, stands refuted with the same logical analysis by which the existence of difference in Samavayas being not due to Upadhis.

So, He must have infinite, different auspicious attributes, where the Difference is real (according to Vaisheshikas).

The Vaisheshikas accept the samavaya relationship between Guna and Guni (quality and its possessor) and such other entities like cause and effect, action and its object, Jaathi (generic attribute) and its individual member, Vishesha and eternal objects etc. This requires the acceptance of Difference between the possessor and individual qualities etc and thus leads to infinite regression. (If Difference is not accepted, it leads to Iswara not having any qualities etc). We, on the other hand, accept that there is no difference between Iswara and His qualities (or between the individual qualities etc), but postulate Vishesha which functions in place of Difference itself. Hence, the infiniteness of the qualities of Iswara is well established.

Note: The infinite regression is shown thus. If there is a difference between Iswara and His quality, there must be difference between the first difference itself and Iswara (called second difference). There will have to be a third difference between the second difference and Iswara again and this will have to continue endlessly. Sri Harsha, an Advaita writer has used this argument against the existence of Difference itself.

So, to avoid this logical faux-pas, we have to accept that Iswara and His quality are identical. The same argument when extended will prove that all qualities of Iswara and Himself are identical and He can not have infinite numbers of auspicious qualities. The postulation of Vishesha which is called Bheda prathinidhi (represents Bheda in its actions, but permits Identity without opposing it in essence) by Tatvavada avoids this problem. Vaisheshikas do not have this option, though they do agree that Iswara and His qualities have Samavaya relation (which is a single whole) and have perforce to agree with the existence of Difference between them.

After condemning Vaisheshikas, Madhva deals with Bauddha Madhyamika and Advaita doctrines. This implicitly shows that the structure of tenets of both schools is similar and their refutation is by similar arguments.

There is another school, which does not accept the Vedas as authority, which is called Madhyamika Bauddha. They hold that Shunya is the Paratatva. They are of two kinds – one who publicly acknowledge their beliefs and those who do it secretly.

Note: Buddhists, who do not accept Vedas have four groups – Vijnanavada, Shunyavada, Vaibhasika and Sauthranthrika. The Shunya Vadis are either those who openly profess it and secretly do so, while claiming to be accepting the Vedas as authority.

Madhva explains that Advaita also espouses Shunya, while claiming to accept Brahma

Those wicked persons say that the Vedas which consist of Manthra, Brahmana and Upanishads are Atatvaavedaka, (not stating the truth as far as the first two sections are concerned), call themselves as Vedanta followers, while calling Shunya (of the Buddhists) as Brahman.

Note: They are Shunya vadis as they are not accepting the authority of Vedas and describe Brahman in such a manner as is equivalent to Shunya of the Buddhists. Hence, they are hidden Buddhists.

Both the Shunyavadins and the Mayavadins hold that the entire Universe other than the Shunya/Reality, is superimposed on it. Further, the Shunya-reality and Brahman of the Mayavadis (Advaita), do not have any characteristic which can distinguish one from the other. Thus, there is no difference between these two schools.

Madhva, the all knowing, refuted all the Nyaya (logical statements and proof) used by Bauddhas and Mayavadis for the refutation of his Siddhanta. He showed that there is no basis for their claim that Brahman is without any attributes. Thus he refuted both of them like Indra destroying Asuras.

Note: A brief account of the refutation follows in the next fifteen shlokas (28 – 42). It is note worthy that the similarity of the two doctrines and their refutation are both shown together.

Refutation of Bauddha (Madhyamika) and Advaita doctrines

Shunya (under debate) can not be the primal cause of the world as it is unreal. The cause has to be real (Sat), like a potter. By this Anumana, (Vyathireka) the proposition that Shunya is the cause of the world is refuted.

Oh, ascetic (Bauddha), if you say that Shunya is not the cause of the world in the manner in which the Potter is for the Pot; instead it is the cause of the world as it appears due to (primordial) Ignorance, then Shunya can only be the Substratum (Adhishtana) for the Superimposition of the world. Do not say that it is the cause. Oh, one blessed with long life (ironically), You should (go back) and understand properly in your Guru’s house the difference between Substratum and Cause.

Note: Bauddhas say that the unreal world appears superimposed on Shunya due to primordial ignorance, in the same manner as Silver appears superimposed on the shell, due to improper vision

Shunya, the subject of the debate being unreal, can not be an Adhishtana as any entity which has to be one has to be real like the Shukthi or shell. This example quoted by us proves by negation that Shunya can not be Adhishtana also.

Note: The Bauddha was earlier forced to concede that Shunya could not be a cause of the world, in the manner of a Potter making a pot. Now, his argument that it is only an adhishtana is also proved wrong, as any such must be real and Shunya is not.

Madhvacharya now takes up Advaita for refutation

A statement that some thing which does not convey the truth (Atatvaavedaka) is also valid proof is self-contradictory. Therefore, the Mayavadi has to accept that the Vedas are not valid statements (Pramana).

Note: Madhva is considering the argument that Advaita (Mayavada) is not the same as Bauddha doctrines as the former accept the Vedas as authority while the latter do not.

This is answered by the point that any one who says that he accepts some thing as valid and at the same time says that what it says is untrue is guilty of self-inconsistency. Thus he is really saying that the Vedas are not valid Pramanas.

The charge that Advaita does not accept the validity of a major portion of the Vedas – (Mantras and Brahmanas, as well as some Upanishads) is unanswerable once they say that it is Atatvaavedaka, as they do.

Even the portion of the Vedas – Upanishads accepted as valid (Tatvaavedaka) by Mayavadi, who is actually a reviler of the Vedas, can not impart the truth about Brahma, who is held to be inexpressible by Advaita. How, therefore can it be stating the Truth?

Note: The argument is that after disposing of a major portion of the Vedas as Atatvaavedaka (describing unreal things) Advaita uses some portion of the Upanishads to support its tenets. But, one of its main tenets is that Brahma is Avachya (not expressible by words). Thus even the portion of the Vedas accepted as valid and stating the reality, can not describe Brahman and is thus actually stating an unreality only. So the entire Vedas are useless and unreliable for understanding Brahman (Apramana) for them. They are no different from others like Bauddhas who do not accept the Vedas. !!!

If Advaita says that the Veda texts describe Brahman by the three kinds of Lakshana (Jahallakshanaa, Ajahallakshanaa, and Jahadajahallakshanaa), Brahma will be become Vachya (expressible) being the subject of such Lakshanaa, which is unacceptable to them.

Note: Advaita has to show how the Vedas can describe an indescribable Brahman. They take recourse to the explanation that Vedas do so by Lakshana (conveying information indirectly). The three types are

1. Jahallakshana (Exclusive) – It is a function of the word with which it’s primary sense is given up and a secondary meaning related with the primary sense is taken. Eg: Gangayam Ghoshah. Here the primary sense of the word Ganga – the river is given up, as it can not be the location of the village (Ghoshah).

Instead, the bank of the river, is conveyed by Jahallakshana.

2. Ajahallakshana (Inclusive) – A function of the word through which a secondary sense inclusive of the primary sense is conveyed – for example, if one says protect the curds from crows, protection is implied from crows and other predators also.

3. Jahadajahallakshana (Quasi-inclusive) – A part of the main meaning is completely given up and only a part is taken. An example is the Advaita interpretation of the Upanishadic text: Tatvamasi, where Identity is conveyed between the Jiva without his characteristics and limitations and Brahma, without His characteristics of Omniseance etc which are contradictory to each other. The identity refers to pure Chetana – consciousness.

When Mayavada says that the Upanishadic texts convey the Brahman, by any of the three methods and not directly (as He is indescribable), Madhva points out He becomes the subject of such statements and hence becomes Vachya, which is against the tenets of Advaita.

Bhavaprakashika quotes “Yatho vaa imaani bhuthani jaayanthe”, “Satyam jnanam anantham brahma” and “Tatvamasi” as the three types of Vedic texts which are interpreted thus.

According to Advaita, Brahma is Akhanda (bereft of any part or feature) and thus can not be visualised as having any such parts and features. Therefore, the Vedic statements that he is “Satyam Jnanam Anantham” etc can not refer to His attributes.

Therefore, they have to be interpreted to mean absence of attributes like Jadathva (inertness) for Chetanathva etc, which is also unsatisfactory.

Note: A positive statement that Brahma is of the nature of Satya, Jnana etc will have to be forced into a meaning of a negative statement – that He is not aSatya, Ajnana etc. This is against the intention of the Shruti, which is making the positive statements.

Further, Brahma Himself is a Bhava Swaroopa – a positive entity (not the absence of an entity). Therefore, He can not be considered in essence to be only a collection of Abhavas (absence of positive entities – such as Ajnana etc). If these Vedic texts are considered as conveying adjectives (Visheshana) for Him, it is not acceptable to Advaita as He being Nirvishesha (without any attributes) does not have any adjectives of either positive type like being all knowing or negative type like being one who has no Ajnana Therefore, texts like Satya Jnana etc also become Atatvaavedaka (invalid).

Note: The forced negative statements, even if considered as valid do not fit into the most important tenet of Advaita of an attributeless Brahman, who is not of the nature of an Absence of things only.

The important tenets proclaimed by the Vedas (such as Reality of the world, The Supreme Being having infinite auspicious qualities and being free from all defects etc) are established as Mithya (untrue) at all times, as articles of faith according to Advaita. Therefore, learned persons must conclude that such a school is outside the purport of the Vedas and hence is not Vaidika (followers of the Vedas).

Note: For one, who accepts the validity of the Vedas superficially but holds to such tenets as are completely against the Vedas, the nominal acceptance can not absolve him of his being in reality an Avaidika.

The two schools Bauddha and Mayavada which are unacceptable to the good people have no differences between them. Shunya Vada is considered more potent and has been rejected already. Therefore, even a Mayavada follower, who thinks himself as a clever cheat (by trying to hide his true position) has been refuted (by the same arguments).

Note: The correspondence of Mayavada with Buddhism has been established elaborately by Madhva in his compositions Anuvyakhyana, Tatvodyota etc.

There is no difference of any kind between these, Brahma (as per Mayavada) and Shunya of the Bauddhas. Therefore, the Hethu (basis) on which Shunyavada was refuted earlier (in shlokas 28, 31) is also valid in the case of Mayavada.

The Mayavadi’s argument that his Brahma is not Asat like Shunya (of the Bauddha) and therefore this logic is not valid (due to the hethu not being established – Asiddha)) is not tenable.

Note: The Anumanas used in the shlokas 28 and 31 have the hethu that Shunya is Asat (unreal or nonexistent). Advaita tries to avoid it saying that Brahma is not Asat, but as it has all the characteristics of shunya with no differences what so ever, they will have to accept that Brahma is also Asat.

If the Mayavadi does accept Satva (Reality) for Brahman (to achieve distinction from Shunya), He will have Vishesha (attribute), which contradicts the Mayavada tenet of Nirvisheshathva (not having any attributes) of Brahma. By a process of elimination, therefore, they have to accept Asatva for the Brahma.

Note: Advaita have the two options of either accepting complete equality between Brahma and Shunya, thus accepting the logical refutation due to both being Asat, or trying to make a distinction in their Brahma by accepting the quality of Sat (reality) in it, which invites the problem of contradicting their own basic tenet of Nirvisheshathva of Brahma.

The Brahma of Mayavadi is without a second (Advaita), identical with Shunya etc., is not a positive entity and is thus not capable of being cognised, studied or meditated upon and can not give the desired results of Dharma, Moksha etc. The same applies to other similar entities like Vijnana of Vijnanavadi Bauddhas, Shunya etc. which are all inexpressible and unfit for understanding or cognition.

Note: The manner of explaining the essence of Advaita Brahma, Bauddha Shunya etc is the same – It is inexpressible, undifferentiated, without any qualities etc. Therefore, even if one accepts such an entity as having an existence as a positive one (for which there is no example or proof), there is no way by which one such entity can be differentiated from another such entity, leading to the inevitable conclusion that they are identical to each other, with differences only of nomenclature.

After refuting Bauddhas and Advaita, Madhva takes up Charvaka school

If it is argued that the Vedas are invalid, there will be no Pramanas on Dharma and such other (extrasensory) entities. The Charvaka, who argues that Prathyaksha (direct cognition) is alone a valid pramana, has no means of establishing the absence of such entities like Dharma.

Note: For extrasensory entities like sin, merit etc there can not be sensory proof (by definition). Unaided Anumana can not prove either their existence or non-existence. Thus, they have to be known only through Agama pramana. The Charvaka, who does not accept the validity of Agamas also has no way to DENY their existence.

A statement of a person can never be accepted as a valid Pramana for extra-sensory entities, as it is composed by a person, with the example of a statement of a mad person.

Note: If a claim is made that even for extrasensory entities, one can accept the words of a wise man like Buddha, Madhva refutes the claim by giving the Anumana, to prove the possible invalidity of a composition where the hethu is “composed by a person” and example is “composed by a mad man”. It is not his case that ALL such compositions must be invalid, but that one can NEVER be sure that a specific one is valid.

The “wise” person concerned may be (really) ignorant or be a deceiver, as he is a man, like Chaithra, who is taken as the example. Therefore, any Anumana which is given to prove a specific person as all knowing can be countered by another proving the opposite.

Note: If we have to accept the words of an individual person as authority in matters of dharma etc which are not capable of verification directly, we have to be sure that he knows the subject fully in the first place.

As we ourselves are ignorant on the subject, we can never be certain as to the extent of his knowledge and therefore can we really rely upon his unsupported statement?

Further, we can also not be sure whether he is telling the truth or falsehood with unknown motives. Proof of his telling the truth which is not susceptible for verification by Prathyaksha can only be Anumana, which can always be countered by another one proving the opposite conclusion, with a different suitable example.

Hence, only when his words are supported by Agama, there can be some certainty about the validity of his statements. This applies without any distinction to the words of all prophets who lay down their own prescriptions of Dharma etc usually relying on the claim of a direct approval by the Supreme Being, which can not be verified by others.

The evil Shastras against the Vedas which are accepted only on account of unjustified insistence on one’s beliefs (unsupported by logic) teach the Supreme Being in a manner different from what He actually is (as described by the Vedas etc). The persons who have accepted such Shastras and worship the Supreme Being accordingly will only attain the fearsome Andhahthamas world, which is the home of all sorrows.

Note: One has to know the validity of one’s beliefs about the extrasensory entities like God, Dharma etc.

All Paurusheya compositions are suspect for the reasons explained earlier. Only when they are supported by the Apaurusheya Vedas, which are proved to be free from all defects, can they be accepted. Following invalid beliefs and wrong paths can only lead to eternal sorrow.

Madhvacharya now discusses the features of Mukti

If our Siddhanta is accepted as valid, the good people will enjoy their essential nature of bliss in Moksha along with the enjoyment of different objects of pleasure like Shabda etc. This will be granted by Sri Hari, also called Adhokshaja.

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